The
Appellants who had been terminated by their employer, DARTEX, applied for leave
to apply for prerogative orders of certiorari and mandamus.
Kalegeya, J., struck out their application for the reason that they ought to
have first applied for an extension of time within which to apply for leave
sought. As this was not done the application was incompetent as time barred.
They filed another miscellaneous civil cause seeking three orders: extension
of time to file an application for orders of certiorari and mandamus,
and leave to file a representative suit. Bubeshi, J., dismissed the application
as defective because it was improper to consider the issue of enlargement of
time where the representative capacity of the Applicants had not first been determined.
The Appellants approached a single judge for extension of time to file an
application for orders of certiorari and mandamus. The single
judge dismissed the application mainly on the ground that if the Appellants
were dissatisfied with the decision of Bubeshi, J., the remedy was to appeal
against it, instead of seeking the same orders before a single Judge of the
Court. Thereafter, the Appellants went back to the High Court and filed another
application for leave to file a representative suit. Kimaro, J., granted the
application. Once the application for leave to file a representative suit was
granted, the Appellants filed in the High Court an application seeking
extension of time to apply for prerogative orders of certiorari and mandamus.
Kyando, J., dismissed the application holding that if the Applicants were
aggrieved by the dismissal of their application by Kalegeya, J., they should
have appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Appellants ultimately appealed to the
Court of Appeal contending that once the application was struck out by
Kalegeya, J., it was still open to the Appellants to file in the High Court the
application which was determined by Kyando, J.